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FOR RELEASE TUESDAY A. M. 'S
REMARKS OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD (D . , MONTANA)
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THE

NIX~N

DOCTRINE

I have not come he r e to make a political speech .

Spring is

not the season for politics , unless you are a young man running
for the Presidency .
term.

Or unless you are a President in your first

I am no longer that young .

Senate .

I am in my fourth term in the

I run for office only in Montana and I have only recently

been re - elected .
In any event, the subject of my remarks is not political .
The Nixon Doctrine is

n~t

a partisan policy .

by the President as a partisan thrust .
Senate with a political parry .

It was not advanced

It was not met in the

On the contrary, when the

Preside~t

issued this Declaration on Asian policy eighteen months ago,
support was immediately extended to him from the Senate.
came from Reoublicans and it came from Democrats .

It
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What differences there are with regard to fore i gn re lations ,
derive from policies not from politics and they are shared by
members of both parties .
partisan forum.
grind.

The Senate, today, is not an intensel y

As Majority Leader, I have no political axes to

My relationship with a Republican President has been

correct and cordial.

In matters of foreign policy, the relat i on-

ship does not differ greatly from that which existed with his
predecessor, a Democrat.
Over the years in Washington, I have seen something of the
burdens of the Presidency.

They are great and lonely.

affairs, the President is out in front at all times.
is direct and relentless.

In fore i gn
The pressure

In this connection, when the late

John F. Kennedy assumed personal responsibility for the Cuban
debacle, he quoted an old saying,

"victory has a hundred fathers

and defeat is an orphan. 11
Regardless of party, a President is entitled t o und er-·
standing in his responsibilities.

Since I have been in the Sena te,

it has been my practice to extend to the incumbent of the
Presidency whatever I could in the way of support, cooperation
and consolation .

In doing so, however , I have not overlooked

the separate Constitutional obligations of Senators nor the
Leadership ' s additional responsibilities to the other 99 members
of the Senate.

Three Presidents have known that I do not stand

on partisan ground.

They have also known where I stood on the

issues .
The Nixon Doctrine is one of those issues because it
is a touchstone in our relations with Asia and the rest of the
world .

The Doctrine was set forth with the intent of bringing

about an adjustment in U.

s.

policy in the Western Pacific.

Eighteen months later, there is concern with the follow - through.
This concern does not arise from a retrogression to
some sort of isolation .

Provided the issues are clearly

presented, the people of the nation are d iscernihg enough to
recognize that the alternative to one distortion is not another.
I reiterate, provided the issues are clearly presentee.

- 4 There is no escape by national isolation from the
complexities of our times.

We will have to live with these

complexities and work with them, and do so in cooperation with
other nations of the world or in conflict with other nations .
There is no shell of sky lar ge enough to shut out the rest of
the globe .

There is no sweep of ocean .

There is no electronic

shield , no insulating web of missiles .
Isolation is no answer to the nation's needs .

But

neither is internationalism some sort of incantation against
the ills of international life .

We will search in vain to

safeguard our secur ity and well - being by an internationalism
which leads us to pr oject military forces into the farthest
reaches of the globe and to maintain them there without the
comprehension of the people of this nation and without the
understanding and cooperation of the rest of the world's people .
That reality ought not to be overlooked in an excess
of concern in thP. F.xec,lti ve Br;:ml"ll tlta.t. t.he l1n•cri can people

- 5 will "retreat to isolation, ·• at any suggestion of an adjustment
in the present course of foreign policy .

We would do well,

instead , to note carefully the danger of persisting in a course
which has already alienated many people at home and abroad and
has led the nation a long way down the road to an isolated
internationalism .
If I may lay aside, then, this non- issue of isolation
along with partisan politics, as a basis for my remarks, I would
like to turn your attention, now, to the Nixon Doctrine .

The

subject is of particular interest because shortly after the
Doctrine was set forth in the summer of 1969, I went to Southeast
Asia .

I did so at the request of the Pnesident, and in the

course of the journey, sought to convey some understanding of
the President's new approach to Asia .
In a public report in September 1969, I pointed out
that the Nixon Doctrine did not mean the United States wae
ing its back on Asia .

Rather, the Doctrine was designed to

tu~n -

- 6 reduce the factor of U.
problems of that region.

s.

military participation in the
The Doctrine's aim, too, was to fore-

close new situations of dependency as had developed in Viet Nam;
contrary to our interests such situations tended to lead to
involvement in Asian conflicts .
In further interpretation of the Doctrine, I noted
that we intended to alter aid - policies by placing more emphasis
on economic aid and less on military help .

Even with regard to

economic aid, moreover , it was to be expected that we would
shift from a unilateral approach and participate when desirable
in whatever multi- sided cooperation Asian nations were inclined
to develop themselves.
I made clear that the Nixon Doctrine did, indeed,
imply major adjustments in long- standing U.

s.

policies in the

Western Pacific, policies which had been formulated in the
aftermath of World War II and the Korean War.

Circumstances

had long since changed greatly and we had not kept pace.

As

- 7 a result, we found ourselves more deeply involved in Southeast
Asia than warranted by the nation ' s interests.
had become both anachronistic and wasteful .

The U. S. role

Most seriously, an

over- long persistence in that role had led us into the tragedy
of Viet Nam .

The time had come to alter it .

It seemed to me that the essence of the Nixon Doctrine
was to be found in the President's frequent references to a new
11

low- profile., policy.

sta~ed

I agreed fully with that concept and so

many times in Asia and at home .

Moreover, the Administra-

tion soon made clear that the new Doctrine would apply, not only
in Asia but throughout the world.

With that extension, too, I

agreed completely .
During 1969 and the early months of 1970, the Executive
Branch elaborated the Nixon Doctrine in specific acticns .

The

U. S. military base structure was curtailed in the Far East .
Reductions were made in official personnel throughout the region.
The Executive Branch entered into negotiations with the Japanese

- 8 government pursuant to the agreement which the Preident had
achieved with Japan on the Okinawan question.

That settlement

promised to remove a spur of increasing tension in U. S. - Japanese
relations .

Largely by the President's personal efforts, diplo-

matic relations were restor ed with Prince Sihanouk's Cambodia
and the restoration seemed to check the danger of a spill-over
of Vietnamese hostilities into that nation .

Initiatives were

also taken by the President to enlarge contact with the Chinese
People's Republic .
The most significant implications of the Nixon Doctrine,
of course , involved Viet Nam .

Despite obvious difficulties of

immediate ap plication, U. S. military forces in Viet Nam were
reduced by 100,000 men between July 1969

a~d

April 1970.

With

the reduction came a sharp dr op in casualties and in the cost of
the war .

At the same time, new U. S. leadership was supplied to

the negotiations in Paris .
peace in Viet Nam .

Hopes quickened for a negotiated

- 9 Elsewhere in the world, the inertia in U. S . policy
seemed to be ending under the impetus of the Nixon Doctrine.
There were indications of an intentm reduce the cost of maintaining a garrison of half a million military personnel and
dependents in Western Europe .

The new SALT talks on disarmament,

as they involved ICBM's, ABM's and other laconic euphemisms of
civilization's suicide, opened on an encouraging note.
Defense budget, swollen with cost over- runs and

oth~r

A
waste as

well as the price of the Vietnamese War, began to be curbed in
the wake of the Senate's great debate on the Anti- Ballistics
Missile .
The Nixon Doctrine, in short, appeared to have set
off a chain reaction which promised to bring up to date the
nation's international security affairs.
in the Senate ar·d in the nation.

It was most welcome

For a long time, we had

remained wedded to the needs of another era.

Ee

h~d

continued

to indulge ourselves with polic)es and pra..!ticer. bor:1 of
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another time.

As a nation, we had heen so deeply c oncerned

for two decades with threats from abroad, that we had overl ooked
the erosion of the natiJn's inner security and well- being.
The Nixon Doctrine opened the shutters on these musty
thought - processes.

In so doing, there was revealed the possi-

bility of adjustments of policy abroad which would also redound
to the benefit of the situation within the nation .

Billions of

dollars of taxes, not to speak of the creative skills az:..! ene:cgy
of young people, were involved in the excessive and inc r eas ingly
isolated search for national security in Viet Nam a nd el sewhere
abroad .

With the advent of the Nixon Doctrine, it

see!l~e d

that

some of these Dmmense resour ces might begin t o be c hanne led
into urgent needs at home .
In my judgment, the President de s e,.ves g::-eat c red i t
for having established this turning point.

The Ni xon Doctrine

was an invitation to change-- long overdue C'l lP!ge- - if 1 · a y use
that overworked word, a c hange tn prj or ltie s .
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Then , there was April 30, 1970 and the American
military incursion into Cambodia .

The event is recent .

remember it and there is no point in a re-run .
position clear,

~et

You

To make my

me say only that I opposed the incursion

before it began; I was saddened by its beginning; I regard it,
even now, with regret, although it is held in some
have been a

11

q~arters

to

successful operation . ''

At the time, it seemed to me that the 1ncursic1
the war deep into what had been, for all practical

thr~~t

purpr~ ~s,

the only non- dependent nation in Indochina in which t.he:-e
existed a measure of stability self- achieved under a
responsive civilian government.

Most serious, the CamJodian

incursion enlarged the battlefield.
to prolong the U.

re~sonably

In so

doi~g,

s . involvement and open up

~· ne~·;

it p1omised
::t"--'Ce of

U. S. casualties .
That position was not arrived \t li
re-asserted lightly

no~1.

The C'ambod1au

~ltly

~: ..:-uu;ion 'hl~

,):lst'i.fiec
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largely in terms of saving American lives.

That is a considera··

tion that has always weighed heavily with me and every other
member of the Senate.

It was apparent then, however, and it

is apparent now that the termination of our involvement i n the
war in Viet Nam and a prompt withdrawal would save far more
American lives than an enlargement of the area of c onfli c t.
As it was, in thebrief invasion of Cambodia a year

ago 362 Americans died and 2, 205 were wounded--in t he p:.":'•'"'Ces::
of

11

saving American lives. 11

And in the proces.s of

11

sa.v; i:t;

American lives, '1 our forces in Indochina have incurr-:'.1

r

r s ual -

ties of 4,000 dead and 18,000 wounded in the y ear c.:..r··.:-: "!';he
Cambodian incursion.

In the light of those gr i m

f te;.-::.·~<·,

may well be asked--are we saving lives or saving

f3c~?

question becomes even more pertinent whe1. rmt :·.;"1

i~'''.!

of total casualties:

it

The

t:-=: :-;r.ec tivc

54,000dead; almost 300, CJ:) wo'..tr:(' e:.' , since

the beginning of this tragic conflict .

- 13 This sacrifice of American life to date is indicative
of the magnitude of the war's toll.
benefit it was intended,
greatly in the war.

The people, for whose
have, themselves, suffered

Hundreds of thousands of Indochinese men,

women and children, have been killed and maimed.
created millions of refugees .

The war has

Ancient cultures and the natural

environment in which they flourished have been damaged beyond
calculation by the devastating tools of modern warfare.
If the war was widened by the Cambodian incursion,
it was widened, again, by the Laotian incursion .

With that

development, what was once the Vietnamese conflict became a
full - fledged Indochina war.

What was once an American involve-

ment in South-Viet Nam was consolidated into an American involvement in all of Indochina .

Notwithstanding linguistic gymnastics,

an extension of warfare into vast new areas of combat cannot be
depicted as a contraction of the war .

- 14 The fact is that we are still held fast in the evershifting current of a struggle which has gone on almost continuously for a quarter of a century.
the end of the tunnel .

It is a war which does not stop at the

borders of South Viet Nam .
Cambodia.

It is a war without light at

It does not stop at the borders of

It does not stop at the borders of Laos.

is the end?

Where, then,

Indeed, there may be none, unless it is in Peking

or beyond, in a worldwide nuclear inferno.
How we are entrapped or, more accurately perhaps, how
we entrap ourselves in this pattern of expanding violence is
illustrated by events in Cambodia.

I would note that on April

30, 1970, there were scarcely a half-dozen American officials
in Cambodia and they were carrying out the most limited diplomatic functions .

Ther e are now many times that number and they

are carrying on a variety of functions.
On April 30, 1970, we had no obligations whats oever
to the government of Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia; its fate was

- 15 in its own hands .

Since the overthrow of Sihanouk, we have

already made aid - commitments totaling $260 million to the
successor government .

That government's fate is not in its

own hands; it is now in ours .

It is dependent for survival on

the United States and on the Saigon government which, in turn,
is dependent on the United States .
To be sure, the U. S. ground forces which were sent
into the Cambodian border regions were withdrawn after a campaign
of several weeks.

To be sure, in Laos, U. S. service personnel

have not set foot on the ground in any great numbers.

Presumably,

in deference to the Cooper- Church amendment, they have been
restricted to hovering a few feet above the ground .
U.

s.

However,

planes and helicopters crisscross Laos and Cambodia many

times a day .

They fly missions of bombing and other direct

combat support, supply, transport, evacuation, reconnaissance
and whatever .

U. S. planes and helicopters are now shot down

in both Cambodia -9-nd Laos as well as in Viet Nam and men often

- 16 die when they are shot down.

We do not disinvolve ourselves by

withdrawing on the ground while we plunge in more deeply through
the air.

Involvement is involvement, whatever it is called.
To be sure, the President deserves every credit for

having reduced overall U.

s.

troops numbers in Viet Nam by more

than 200,000 since the beginning of his Administration.
there are over 300,000 Americans still in Indochina .

But

Further-

more, the use of U. S. air-power seems much more intensive than
a year ago- - that, in a primitive region which has already been
bombed with more than twice the total mnnsge dropped in both
World War II and the Korean War.
Costs are costs wherever incurred.

Casualties are

casualties whether they are received on the ground or in the
air.

While

lower costs are better than higher and fewer

casualties are obviously to be preferred to more, all losses
are tragic in a mistaken war.
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If it is not in the i nterest of this nation to be in
the war with ground forces, how can it be with air forces?

To

be sure, it may seem more palatable but it is not more purposeful .
It is not less wasteful .
The prerequisite of a meaningful application of the
Nixon Doctrine in Southeast Asia seems to me to be the termination of the U. S . military involvement-- land, air and sea-- in
Indochina and military withdrawal from that region, lock, stock
and barrel .

That termination is not yet visible.

That with-

drawal is not yet in sight.
It is not only with regard to Indochina that there
are grounds for concern over what has happened to the Nixon
Doctrine since April 1970 .

Digressions or delays appear to be

developing elsewhere in Asia .

It is many months later, but the

details of the Okinawan settlement have yet to be completed by
the Executive Branch.

Difficulties with Japan have also arisen

over trade questions and a short time ago were even allowed to

- 18 reach a tempestuous stage.

As I see it, U. S.-Japanese trade is

of immense value to both countries even as a political relationship of mutual consideration and forebearance between the two
countries is essential to the elaboration of the Nixon.;Doctrine
in the Western Pacific.

It is disturbing, therefore, to find

what appearsto be the intrusion of petty bickering and personal
pique into these vital ties.
Also of great importance to the Nixon Doctrine is the
restoration of civility with the Chinese People's Republic .

The

President has shown a consistent initiative in this connection.
Whether a satisfactory relationship can be achieved at this
time is another matter .

Certainly, it is not a very promising

prospect when the Indochinese war has again been extended to
within minutes bombing range of the Chinese borders and, in the
circumstances, the Chinese have re-aff irmed publicly their complet(
support of the North Vietnamese.

Moreover, U.

s . policy has yet

to come to grips with the vehement rejection of a ''two-China "

- 19 concept by both the government of the Republic of China and
the Chinese People's Republic .

Both insist that Taiwan and

mainland China are par ts of one Chinese nation .
Elsewhere i n the world , in Wester n Europe in par ticular,
there seems also to have been a r etr ogression from the Nixon
Doctrine .

While the need fo r a cut in the consignment of U. S.

forces to Europe is mor e and mor e recognized in the Senate, the
reluctance of the Executive Branch to act remains as great under
this Administration as it was under its predecessor .

It is

reluctance, apparently, stimulated by the anxieties of the
German and other European governments who remain unwilling,
nevertheless , to relieve this nation of any substan tial pa r t
of the present one- side d burd en of the costs of NATO defense .
To maintain U. S. forcos in Eurcpe is estimated to
account for $14 billion of the annual Defense Department budget .
This expenditure is made, presumably, to forestall or to meet a
possible military thrust from the Soviet Union .

It is an

- 20 -

expenditure which has gone on year in and year out for almost
two decades .

In the meantime, by contrast, in the policies of

both the Western European countries and the Soviet Union, the
fear of such a conflict has been progressively downgraded and,
today, the accent in both pa r ts of Europe is almost entirely on
the contacts of peace .
Let me make clear that the sentiment in the Senate for
a change in U. S. policies regarding NATO has nothing to do with
severing treaty relationships with Western Europe or with the
complete withdrawal of the U. S. military garrison from Europe.
The NATO treaty remains highly regarded and a U. S. military
presence in Europe, as an ear nest of the importance

~shich

this

nation still attaches to the alliance, is a principle that has
long been accepted .

That is not the queJtion.

What is sought

in the Senate, rather, is a substantial rcduct·on in the halfmillion of U. S. forces with dependents that are maintained in
Europe at such great cost to the people of this nation .

The

- 21 -

resistance of the Executive Branch to this change in my judgme21"t
is ill- founded and may well produce , in time, a Congressional
reaction which will compel drastic reductions.
To bring these remarks to a close, I want to note again,
as I did at the outset, my deep belief in the urgency of the
adjustments of U. S. policy which are implicit in the Nixon
Doctrine.

I would be less than candid; however, if I did not

express the concern which I have with the

digres -

diverge~cies ,

sions, dodges and delays which have been encc."ltered in carrying
out the Doctrine .
We have not escaped the consequences of this procrastination at home .

In my judgment the absence of a vigorous

follow- through on the Doctrine has had much to do with the
persistence of the inflation and the slack in the economy .
has had much to do with our

conti~uing

inability to confront

fully the financial and other problems of the States and
localities.

It has had much to do with the inadequate

l~ay

It
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in which we are meeting the whole range of c ompell ing needs of
our national life whether they be pollution, welfare, unempJ oyment, violence or whatever .
There is blame enough to spare for things done and not
done .

Where the finger points often depends on who is pointing

and I shall not point mine .

The funoamental difficulty, as I

see it , is that the Pr esident and the Congress functicn in a
government grown immense .

It is a government whose gears QUSt

grind in a complex synchronization if they are to

g~ind

at all.

The machinery is not easily moved by the President alone and
cer tainly not, alone, by the Congress .

Yet it must be moved if

ther e is to be a fulfil l ment of t he promise of the Nixon Doctrine
and a realistic a d justment of our policies in line with its
implications .

In my judgment, the primary need, the critical

need,is an end to the involvement in Indochina:

an

~nd,

period .

In their separate Constitutional aath0ritv as nPcessary and, in
cooperation, where possible, the effort must be made by the
President and the Congr ess to meet that need .
The Republic deserves no less.

DRAFT

March 25, 19n
THE NIXON DOCTRINE

I have not come here to make a political speech .

Spring is

not the season for politics, unless you are a young man running for
the Presidency .

Or unless you are a President in your first term .

am no longer that young .

I am in my fourth term in the Senate .

I

I run

for office only in Montana and I have only recently been re··elected .
In any event, the subject of my remarks is not political.
The t'ixo :t Doctrine is not a partisan policy .

the President as a partisan thrust .
a political parry .

On

It was not advanced by

It was not met in the Senate with

the coPtrary, when the President issued this

Declaration on Asian policy eighteen months ago, support was immediately
extended to him from the Senate .

It came from Republicans and it came

from Democrats.
What differences there are with regard to foreign relations,
derive from policies not from politics and they are shared by members of
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both parties .

The Senate, today, is not an intensely partisan forum.

As Majority Leader, I have no political axes to grind .

My

with a Republican President has been correct and cordial.

relationship
In matters of

foreign policy, the relationship does not differ greatly from that which
existed with his predecessor, a Democrat .
Over the years in Hashington, I have seen something of the
burdens of the Presidency .

They are great and lonely .

affairs, the President is out in front at all times.

)w~~"'~ -) ~

In foreign
The pressure is

direct and relentless . Jfhe late John F. Kennedy assumed personal
responsibility for the Cuban

debacl~ '81 i

' lR

he quoted an old saying,

"Victory has a hundred fathers and defeat is an orphan . "
Regardless of party, a President is entitled to understanding
in his responsibilities .

Since I have been in the Senate, it has been

my practice to extend to the incumbent of the Presidency whatever I could

in the way of support, cooperation and consolation.

In doing so, however,

- 3 -

I have not overlooked the separate Constitutional obligations nor the
/'
Leadership's additional responsibilities to the other 99 members of the
Senate .

Three Presidents have known that I do not stand on parti san

ground.

They have also known where I stood on the issues .
The Ni xon Doc t rine is one of those issues because i t i s a

touchstone in our relati ons with Asia and the rest of the world .

The

Doctrine was set forth with the intent of bringing about an adjustment
iP U. s. policy in the \</estern Pacific .

Eighteen months later, there

is concern with the follow - through .
This concern does not arise from a retrogression to some
sort of isolation .

Provided the issues are clearly presented, the

people of the nation are discerni ng enough to recognize that the
alternative to one distortion is not another .
the issues are clearly presented.

I reiterate , provided

- 4 -

There is no escape by national isolation from the complexities of our times .

We will have to live with these complexities and

work with them, and do so in cooperation with other nations of the world
or in conflict with other nations .

There is no shell of sky large enough

to shut out the rest of the globe.

There is no sweep of ocean .

There

is no electronic shield, no insulating web of missiles.
Isolation is no answer to the nation's needs.

But

ne~er

is

internationalism some sort of incantation against the ills of international
life.

\ole will search in vain to safeguard our security and well-being by

an internationalism which leads us to project military forces into the

farthes~~he globe and to maintain them ~~-~without the
comprehension of the people of thJPnation and without the understanding

"

and cooperation of the rest of the world's pecple .

- 5 -

That reality ought no+ to be overlooked in an excess of

~,A,

concern in the Executive Branch,
isolation," at

~suggestion
1\

of foreign policy.

~

C·~t

the American

peopl~"retreat

to

of an adjustment in the present course

We would do well, instead, to note carefully the

danger of persisting in a course which has already alienated many people
"-

~... ...re;

at

ho~e

and, abroad, .... has led the nation a long way down the road to an

isolated internationalism .
If I may lay aside, then, this non-issue of isolation along
with partisan politics, as a basis for my remarks, I would like to turn
your attention, now, to the Nixon Doctrine.

The subject is of particular

;.. If· ~·
interest because shortly after the Doctrine was set
Southeast Asia .

fort~

I went to

I did so at the request of the President, and in the

course of the journey, sought to convey sore understanding of the
President's new approach to Asia .

,J
~

1Cl'9
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In a public report in September 1969, I pointed out that
the Nixon Doctrine did not mean the United States was turning its back

If (..
on Asia .

Rather, the Doctrine was designed t1 reduce the factor of

~" ,--4'~
The Doctrine ' s aim, too, was to foreclose new situations of dependency
~

as had developed in Viet Nam; svc h s 111t:te: lsi! 1, contrary to our

,.

;;t;._,.~!. ~

interes~~d to lead to involvement in Asian conflicts .
In further interpretation of the Doctrine, I noted that we
intended to alter aid-policies by placing more emphasis on economic
aid and less on military help .

Even with regard to economic aid ,

moreover , it was to be expected that we would shift from a unilateral
approach and; 5 t:B

~

participate

in whatever multi - sided cooperation Asian nations were inclined to
develop themselves .
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I made clear that the Nixon Doctrine did, indeed, imply
major adjustments in long-standing U. S . policies in the '.[estern
Pacific , policies '.l'hich had been formulated in the aftermath of
Horld War II and the Korean '..lar .

greatly and we had not kept pace .

Circumstances had long since changed

As ~a~ ~esult,

we found ourselves more

deeply involved in Southeast Asia than warranted by the nation's interests .

s.

Tne U.

role had becone both anachronistic and wasteful .

Most seriously,

an over- long persistence in that role had led us into the tragedy of Viet
fi. <L

•

The ti1ne had come to alter it.
It seemed to me that the essence of the Nixon Doctrine was

to be found in the President's frequent references to a new "low-profile"
policy .

I agreed fully with that concept and so stated many times in

Asia and at home .

Moreover, the Administration soon made clear that

the new Doctrine would apply , not only in Asia but throughout the r.I'Orld .
With that extension, too, I agreed completely .
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During 1969 and the

ear~onths

of 1970, the Executive

Branch elaborated the Nixon Doctrine in specific actions .
military base structure was curtailed in the Far Zast .
made in official personnel throughout the region .
:I

The U. S .

Reductions were

The Executive Branch

P "~>

entered into negotiations with the Japanes, government pursuant to the
agreement which the President had achieved with Japan, 1
~on the Okinawan question .

il &::

P'C

' TL •

That settlement promised to remove a

spur of increasing tension in U. s .-Japanese relations .

Largely by

the President ' s personal efforts , diplomatic relations were restored
with Prince Sihanouk's Cambodia and the restoration seemed to check the
danger of a spill- over of Vietnamese hostilities into that nation .
Initiatives were also taken by the President to enlarge contact with
the Chinese People's Republic .
The most significant implications of the Nixon Doctrine,
of course, involved Vi et Nam .

Despite obvious difficulties of immediate
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application, U.

s.

::d.li tary forces in Viet Nam were reduced by

100,000 men between July 1969 and April 1970 .

With the reduction

came a sharp drop in casualties and in the cost of the war.
same time , new U.
Paris .

s.

At the

leadership was s upplied to the negotiations in

Hopes quickened for a negotiated peace in VietNam .
Elsewhere in the world, the inertia in U. S . policy seemed

to be ending under the impetus of the Nixon Doctrine .

There were indi -

cations of an intent to reduce the cost of maintaining a garrison of
half a million military personnel and dependents in Western Europe .
The new SALT talks on disarmament, as they involved ICBM' s , ABM' s and
other laconic euphemisms of civilization ' s suicide , opened on an encouraging note .

A Defense budget , swollen with cost over - runs and other waste

as well as the price of the Vietnamese Har, began to be curbed in the
wake of the

~enate ' s

great debate on the Anti -Ballistics Missile .

